originated as subunits of the FAO that eventually became independent, including the World Food Program (WFP), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and the Standing Committee on Nutrition (SCN). A significant number of international food security institutions have also been established under the auspices of World Bank Group such as the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Other international institutions are independent of the UN or Bretton Woods institutions, such as the Food Aid Committee (FAC).
Table 1: Selected International Institutions relevant to Food Security
This proliferation of international institutions responsible for food security reveals a pattern of punctuated, rather than gradual, growth. Indeed, four key periods of proliferation can be identified, as highlighted in Table 1 which lists selected global food security governance institutions, including the years they were established and their mandates.
The first period occurred during the late 1960s and saw the development of new international food assistance institutions in response to growing demand for food aid in developing countries and the emergence of food surpluses among Western grain producing countries. Key institutions that emerged during this period were the WFP and the FAC. The second period of institutional proliferation occurred after the 1970s world food crisis. During this period the CFS, IFAD, World Food Council (WFC) and the CGIAR were established. 2 A third period of punctuated institutional growth, for which the 1996 World Food Summit (WFS) and its follow-up in 2001 were the catalytic events, occurred during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Those summits led to international consensus to reduce world hunger in half by 2015, an objective now enshrined as the first Millennium Development Goal, 3 a global plan of action to address food insecurity, 4 and an international set of voluntary guidelines on the human right to food. 5 The 2008 global food crisis resulted in the most recent period of institutional proliferation including the establishment of the UN High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis and the G8 Global Partnership on Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition.
Variation in institutional forms
Global food security governance also displays a significant variation of institutional mechanisms over time, ranging from 'bricks and mortar' formal institutions to informal networks, to voluntary guidelines. The 1940s to 1970s witnessed the growth of formal international institutions with specialized mandates, complex and hierarchical internal organizational structures, and staffed by international bureaucrats. Beginning in the 1990s there was a marked shift towards a greater emphasis on expanding the principles and rules based framework for food security. The declarations adopted by the 1996 and 2001 World Food Summits and norm creation by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights advanced international consensus on the human right to food and elaborated its programmatic and legal content. 6 More recently, the role of transnational networks of government officials and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has become increasingly prominent in global food security governance, such as those that participate in the SCN, the CFS and the G8.
Knowledge and food security
Developing awareness of the causes and effects of food security have similarly influenced the practices of global food security governance. The term 'food security' first entered the lexicon during the 1970s world food crisis. 7 That crisis revealed to policy makers new drivers of hunger, such as price volatility and the unreliability of food supply on international markets. The first world food crisis also challenged assumptions about how world food markets worked and focused the attention of states on exploring new instruments of international cooperation. 8 As the concept of food security continued to evolve, it incorporated advances in the understanding of the causes of hunger. In particular, the work of Nobel Prize winning economist Amartya Sen, which demonstrated that access to food, and not just food supply, was critical to averting famine, reoriented international policies to look beyond traditional food production and supply issues. 9 In turn, it initiated a major rethink of international food security policies away from the old approach of traditional bulk transfers of food towards incorporating a set of interventions targeting various dimensions and scales, including a greater attention to economic, physical, and social access to food. This multifaceted understanding became the basis of the current international consensus definition of food security, which states that "food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life". 10 More recently, important developments in nutrition science and food processing techniques have contributed to changing practices in global food security governance, such as intergovernmental deliberations on the efficacy of new biotechnologies for food security.
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Diffusion of food security across global governance As a result of these other developments, responsibility for food security is now spread out across the global governance landscape. No longer the exclusive domain of the Rome based UN food agencies, the FAO, the WFP and the IFAD, food security now also falls under the remit of the international human rights system as well as refugee agencies and their regional and non-governmental partners. Technical spheres of governance such as setting international food safety and nutrition standards are overseen by the Codex Alimentarius Commission, which involves the FAO, the World Health Organization (WHO), states, private actors, academics and non-governmental organizations. The World Trade Organization (WTO) also plays a key role as an inter-state forum for negotiating rules on agricultural policies that are directly relevant to food security. 12 In short, the global governance of food security today is highly disaggregated across many institutions and involves state and non-state actors.
Institutional Responses to the 2008 Global Food Crisis: CFS, CFA and G8/G20
The 2008 global food crisis led the international community to devise new institutional responses. The CFS, the CFA and the developments with G8/G20 can be considered to be critical institutional developments in global food security governance, reflecting, respectively, 'something old, something new, and something borrowed'. This allusion to a traditional English good luck phrase for a bride to be is deliberately invoked to emphasize the interconnectedness of disparate objects that support a new collective endeavor. This section addresses the unique characteristics of each institution and their role in contemporary global food security governance, and situates this within the longer term patterns of transformation in global food security governance discussed above.
Something old: the Committee for World Food Security
The CFS has the longest pedigree of the newer food security governance institutions, having been established in 1975 as a standing committee of the FAO to monitor the outcome of the 1974 World Food Conference. 13 The original mandate of the CFS was to assist developing countries to implement national food reserves and coordinate the management of these reserves across developed and developing countries and other market actors. Immediately following the 1973 world food crisis, the world food situation improved considerably and states shifted their focus away from food policy. Efforts to establish food reserves waned, as did interest in the CFS. The CFS enjoyed revived fortunes in 1995/1996 when it became the principal forum for inter-state negotiation in preparation of the 1996 World Food Summit. The World Food Summit successfully put food security on the global agenda and resulted in considerable commitments by states to fight hunger as articulated in the Plan of Action adopted at the World Food Summit . 14 Another outcome of the World Food Summit was an enhanced role for a rejuvenated CFS charged with responsibility for monitoring the implementation of the Plan of Action. 15 This revised mandate for the CFS heightened its visibility through its public monitoring of world hunger and resulted in the development of a new FAO flagship publication, The State of Food Insecurity in the World, to provide updates on world food security and in-depth analysis of key food security policy issues. This normally annual publication has since become highly influential in setting the global food security policy agenda. In addition, international NGOs' (INGOs) participation in the work of the CFS increased. According to McKeon these changes have been critical to advancing a progressive food security agenda at the FAO and enhancing the legitimacy of the CFS's work. 16 Nevertheless, in the years immediately prior to the 2008 global food crisis, there was growing concern expressed among member states and the FAO secretariat about the ability of the CFS to fulfill its monitoring functions. One concern highlighted by an independent evaluation was that the CFS had become less focused in its activity and less efficient, especially after its completion of the negotiations of the Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security. 17 Thus, in early 2008, on the eve of the global food crisis, FAO member states were discussing ways to improve the efficacy and efficiency of the CFS. The initial vision for a reformed CFS was introduced at the 34 th session of the CFS held in October 2008. The main recommendations that were adopted called for a reduction in the frequency of meetings from twice to once per annum, a reduction in the length of CFS meetings, including in the number of agenda items, the organization of sessions along a central substantive topic, and the streamlining of the drafting of the reports. 18 These recommendations, particularly reducing the frequency and length of CFS meetings, can be interpreted as an effort to diminish the Committee's profile and reign in its scope of activity. This new format would likely have contributed to the weakening of established levels of interpersonal trust and understanding that results directly from frequent and iterative interaction among policymakers. Less frequent and shorter meetings would have reduced the ability of the CFS to address emerging food security issues in a timely manner. As such, these initial recommendations could hardly be interpreted to be in the spirit of supporting the CFS's role but suggested efforts to establish a minimalist version of the Committee.
Given that initial efforts to reform suggested a diminished body, it is all the more notable that the final outcome of CFS reform resulted in an enlarged, expanded and higher profile institution. The actual reform of the CFS must be contextualized vis-à-vis the global food crisis; the discourse of the CFS reform at the official and informal level repeatedly made reference to the crisis as a driver for reform. Negotiations for the reform of the CFS were conducted over an 18 month period and the outcome was approved by FAO members at the 2009 World Summit for Food Security. The negotiations involved a novel organizing mechanism, the so-called 'Contact Group', designed to ensure input from a wide range of relevant stakeholders, including FAO member states, multilateral institutions, the UN High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security (HLTF), the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, INGOs and the private sector. The new role of the CFS includes significant reorientation and expansion of its mandate in order to: 1. Coordinate food security policy discussions and collaboration at the global and regional level among all relevant stakeholders; 2. Promote policy convergence and coordination on food security and nutrition; This expanded mandate is transforming the CFS from an institution whose central role was to be the caretaker of a time-bound and limited objective (i.e., reducing hunger in half by 2015 in the 1996 World Food Summit Plan of Action), into one tasked with becoming 'the foremost inclusive international and intergovernmental platform' to achieve the elimination of hunger and ensuring food security and nutrition for all. 20 This new role will be a major challenge. In addition, the reformed CFS acknowledges the centrality of a human rights-based approach to food security. The human rights focus suggests the CFS will facilitate greater linkages between agriculture, food and trade policies with international human rights norms. Successfully establishing and operationalizing these linkages would mark a considerable accomplishment, particularly given that the economic and social development dimensions of governance have long been said to exist in worlds of solitude. 21 This overhaul of the architecture of the CFS also has significant implications for global food security governance practice. Although states retain exclusive voting rights at CFS meetings, non-state actors have been given greater roles in the Committee's governance. This includes a select group of non-state actors; representatives of multilateral institutions and global civil society that have strong relevance to issues of food security and nutrition that are now designated as participants. Participants enjoy special privileges; they are permitted to take part in the work of the Committee with the right to intervene in plenary and breakout discussions, to contribute to preparation of meeting documents and agendas, and to submit and present documents and formal proposals. 22 The rights of participants differ substantially from the rights of observers, a category that remains for other groups who do not have automatic rights to intervene and participate in all aspects of the Committee's work. Participants in the CFS include the HLTF, WFP, World Bank and WTO, and representatives from transnational peasant movements, such as the Via Campesina, INGOs, such as Oxfam, and philanthropic organizations, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Even though the CFS remains by definition an 'intergovernmental body' that reaffirms the role of states as central actors, in practice, it will primarily function as a truly transnational institution with a highly diverse membership not limited to states. Indeed, the reformed CFS attains a high degree of pluralism not frequently observed in other global governance institutions.
Most of the elements of the pre-global food crisis CFS reform package have not come to pass. For example, the frequency of meetings was not reduced but increased instead. Indeed, the assumption by policymakers going forward is that the CFS will significantly increase its range of activities, not reduce them. To support this expanded mandate, the CFS has created several new supportive apparati: a Bureau made up of the broader membership of the CFS to guide the work program and prepare for plenary sessions; a permanent CFS Secretariat to replace the one which had previously operated on an ad hoc basis; and a High Level Panel Committee of Experts (HLPE) composed of a rotating group of experts in areas related to the scientific, policy and social dimensions of food security to provide evidence-based and expert advice to the CFS Plenary and Bureau to aid the Committee in its policy deliberations. In sum, following the global food crisis there has been a major reorientation in the proposed reform of the CFS that has resulted in an expanded and strengthened Committee that features a greater transnational character.
Something new: The Comprehensive Framework for Action
The Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA) represents a novel institutional development in global food security governance. The CFA is a multilateral consensus policy document, however, it should not be mistaken for an international commitment, set of standards, or new food security rules. It is best understood as an aggregation of the policy priorities and preferences of multilateral institutions.
The CFA sets out the joint position of all the multilateral institutions that are members of the HLTF. In April 2008, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon proposed the idea of a task force to heads of the FAO, World Bank, WTO and WFP during a regular meeting of the UN Chief Executives Board (CEB). 23 The executive leadership of these organizations all agreed on the need for a coordinated, coherent and collective response given the severity of the food crisis. Such a collective response by institutions was consistent with ongoing efforts to pool resources and expertise to maximize policy interventions. Working collectively was also intended to signal to countries affected by the global food crisis, and to donor states holding the purse strings, that multilaterals could be trusted with scarce resources to address rising food insecurity. The HLTF currently boasts 22 members, including UN agencies active in the field of agriculture, food security and humanitarian assistance, as well as international economic governance institutions such as the World Bank, WTO and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The UN Secretary General chairs the HLTF and the FAO Director General is vice-chair. The everyday work of the HLTF is overseen by the HLTF Coordinator, who is also the UN Special Representative on Food Security and Nutrition, and supported by a small secretariat based in Geneva and Rome. It is by far the largest grouping of UN and non-UN institutions to work collaboratively on a single global policy issue to date.
The text of the CFA was negotiated among HLTF members quite rapidly over a four month period and disseminated in July 2008. 24 The CFA has been recognized as a key policy framework at several forums, including the High Level Summit on World Food Security, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and by the G8. The CFA has articulated a common set of policy interventions and objectives that reflect the input from all the HLTF member institutions. The CFA identifies eight priority areas for coordinated action by international organizations, states and other relevant stakeholders. The priority areas are sub-divided into four short-term policies: enhancing access to emergency food and social assistance; increasing smallholder food production; adjusting tax and trade policies that negatively affect food consumers; managing macroeconomic implications of financing food imports and consumption; as well as four longer-term policies: expanding social protection systems; sustaining improvements in smallholder food production; improving international food markets; and developing an international biofuels policy. Given space limitations, it is not possible to address each of these policy areas in detail. However, it is striking that the CFA encompasses policy issues spanning traditional food security policies, such as food assistance and agricultural investment, as well as new food security issues like environmental sustainability and macroeconomic policies. In short, the CFA articulates policy responses to the multiple and complex factors that cause food security instead of focusing on a single issue.
The CFA does not impose specific obligations on individual states. In fact, there was an explicit decision by HLTF members to steer away from calling for a specific financial commitment. 25 Nevertheless, it is critical to recognize the CFA as an achievement in intra-institutional cooperation given the diverging mandates, operational expertise, interests, political constraints and resources of each HLTF member. 26 This is why the CFA reads like a mosaic; breadth was necessary in order to ensure a shared approach politically acceptable to all HLTF members. Another important contribution of the HLTF and CFA process was that it provided a more neutral forum for increased dialogue and engagement by multilateral institutions, in particular among their executive leadership. It is important to recall that such executive leadership is much more accustomed to negotiating with their state principals rather than with other institutions. As such, the CFA should be understood as the outcome of a supranational-level process in which multilateral organizations were the primary actors. Although states and NGOs were informally consulted and updated on the course of the negotiations, they were not direct participants. The CFA is also a living document. In its efforts to update the CFA to better reflect the evolving dynamics of food insecurity, the HLTF engages continuously in stakeholder consultation, including increasing engagement with states, regional organizations and NGOs. 27 Indeed, to address the criticisms of several HLTF members and other stakeholders, an updated CFA (UCFA) was released in September 2010, which includes significant changes, particularly a greater emphasis on the gendered dimensions of food insecurity and the human right to food. 28 Since 2009, the HLTF's work has shifted to ensuring greater operational coherence across multilateral, regional and bilateral policy interventions at the country level. For example, the HLTF has reviewed programs in 50 countries to ensure that multilateral and other partners are supporting receiving governments in a timely and coordinated manner. The work of the HLTF at the country level also seeks to identify mechanisms for better coordination among all actors grounded firmly in the objectives of the CFA to measurably improve food security outcomes in high risk countries and accountability of all partners. From a policy coherence and efficiency perspective, the HLTF's country level work is consistent with the international community's call for greater country ownership, strategic and coordinated action from all partners, complementary short and long term interventions, a strong role for multilateral institutions, and sustained and substantial commitment by all partners. All of these objectives directly correspond with the Rome Principles for Sustainable Global Food Security agreed to at the 2009 World Summit on Food, which set out the contemporary approach to international cooperation on food security. 29 However, the HLTF's shift to coordination at the country level has not been complemented with follow-up on unresolved issues such as trade bans and biofuels, both of which are identified as priority areas of the CFA. This suggests that the HLTF has been less able to influence or is less willing to participate in areas where there is less international consensus.
Something borrowed: the G8/G20
Since 2008, the G8 and G20 have emerged as key 'institutions' in global food security governance. In truth, the G8 and G20 are informal international institutions, better described as political fora in which the world's advanced, and now also emerging developing countries, meet and seek to establish consensus on pressing economic, security and international development issues. 30 The G8 and G20 are intertwined; the G20 is, of course, an expansion of the original G7/8 members of advanced economies, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Russia, to include emerging and middle-income countries such as Brazil, India, China, Mexico, Argentina, South Africa, South Korea, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Although the G20 is regarded as a more inclusive, and therefore more legitimate grouping of states than the G8 because of its inclusion of the majority of the world's population and economic activity, poor developing countries, including the world's most food insecure countries, remain excluded. The G8 continues to meet, however, since 2009 the G20 has effectively replaced the G8 as the leading forum for high-level policy making and coordination.
The G8/G20 hold annual summits that feature meetings of heads of state and counterpart ministers, the agendas for which are finalized over a year-long process of exchanges among civil servants. The outcomes of the G8/G20 summits usually take the form of declarations and communiqués that iterate a consensus position on major policy issues. States have frequently utilized summits as high-level events to announce new intergovernmental initiatives and/or financial commitments. This has included, for example, a commitment of $US 60 billion for the G8 Action Plan for Africa at the 2002 Kananaskis G8 Summit. In the past, summits have led to international cooperation on counterterrorism, financial regulation and official development assistance. Whereas the G8/G20 lack the traditional infrastructure of formal international institutions, they have evolved procedures to enhance their legitimacy as global governance institutions. Even though G8/G20 commitments are nonbinding, Kirton argues these states have invested significant political capital towards improving compliance and transparency of their commitments. Reputation matters to the G8/G20 and these states have enhanced monitoring and public reporting in recent years. 31 The rising challenge of food security was first discussed by G8 heads of state at the 2008 summit in Hokkaido, Japan. The initial summit agenda did not include food security. However, the rapidly deteriorating world food security situation and rising food prices throughout early 2008, and the attention to the food crisis in the international press and by public authorities, had put food security onto the global policy agenda. The proposal to add food security to the G8's summit agenda was not unanimously supported. The United States, Canada, Russia and several European Union member states were reticent because their policies on, inter alia, grain-based biofuel production and export bans had been widely criticized as causal factors of the 2008 global food crisis. The Japanese Prime Minister, Yasuo Fukuda, enrolled the support of British Prime Minister, the UN SecretaryGeneral and World Bank President to support an initiative to include rising food prices to the summit agenda. 32 This proved effective in putting food security on the G8's agenda in the face of opposition from food exporting G8 countries.
During the 2008 Hokkaido Summit the G8 leaders discussed emergency food assistance, rising food prices, biofuel policies, agricultural export restrictions and food reserves. Although G8 states agreed to immediately increase financial support for emergency food assistance there was a lack of consensus on the remaining issues. Nevertheless, G8 heads of state issued a declaration, the Leaders Statement on Global Food Security 33 that reiterated the concern about rising world hunger, the need for renewed support investment in developing country agriculture and the need to mainstream food security in development cooperation. On the issue of governance, the G8 called for a 'global partnership on agriculture and food' among the G8, international institutions and other stakeholders. In addition, G8 leaders tasked their agricultural ministers to come up with policy recommendations for consideration at the 2009 G8 summit and established an Experts Group to monitor individual members' contributions towards supporting global food security. This work agenda was followed up at the 2009 Summit in L'Aquila, Italy. In advance of the 2009 Summit the first ever meeting of G8 agriculture ministers was held, mirroring, to a certain extent, the G8 pattern of delegating responsibility to ministers for specific functional areas as had previously been the practice with finance ministers. In their meetings, the agriculture ministers discussed international food trade and the impacts of the global economic crisis on food security, arguing that agriculture and food security was now at the core of the international agenda. 34 At L'Aquila, G8 leaders made food security a priority item. In their final declaration, the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI), G8 leaders stressed the critical importance of addressing food security and promoting agricultural production in food insecure developing countries. 35 To this end, G8 leaders committed themselves to providing $US 20 billion over three years to support sustainable agriculture development and ensure adequate emergency food assistance. 36 The AFSI was endorsed by a diversity of actors, including many developing countries, the African Union, the UN and the World Bank, all of which were invited to attend the summit.
The AFSI marks the first time G8 discussions on food security resulted in a fixed financial commitment. Past G8 statements of support for fighting food insecurity and supporting agriculture, such as the 1997 Partnership for Development in Africa, the 2001 Strategic Approach to Poverty Reduction, and the 2005 Increasing Agricultural Productivity in Africa, 37 had not previously resulted in any credible financial commitment. In addition, the creation of the AFSI suggests a more central role for the G8 in food security governance. Whereas the G8 had repeatedly supported the work of the HLTF and reform of the CFS, the AFSI affirmed the desire of G8 states to retain some authority over developments in global food security governance. Indeed, with the G20 replacing the G8 in 2009, there was an effort to give the G8 new relevance by focusing on key social and development issues such as food security. By late 2009 the G8 machinery had taken up greater technical and operational responsibility for food security with agriculture, development and finance ministers increasingly mainstreaming global food security into G8 officials' policy work.
However, high level political decision making on food security appears to be shifting out of the G8 and into the G20. At the 2009 G20 summit in Pittsburgh, USA, states repackaged the AFSI and delegated administration for a new agricultural investment credit facility called the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) to the World Bank. 38 The GAFSP is now operational and although yet to receive the full amount of donors' financial pledges, it has disbursed over $US 345 million for improving agricultural production in 12 developing countries. 39 Food security also featured in the 2010 G20 leaders' Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth. 40 In Seoul, G20 members agreed to deepen their policy engagement on food security in several key areas: policies to reduce agricultural price volatility to addressing escalating food prices; rules for investment in agriculture in response to concerns about farmland grabs in developing countries; identification of best practices for improving sustainable food production; and, enhancement of market access opportunities for smallholder farmers.
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At the 2011 G20 Summit, French President Nicholas Sarkozy identified food security a priority issue. Indeed, the G20 discussed food security in the context of global financial reform because of the growing concern over speculation in commodity markets and food price volatility. In advance of the summit, the G20 tasked the World Bank, FAO, IFAD, WTO and OECD to provide states with policy options and recommendations on these issues. On 23 June 2011, G20 ministers of agriculture met and agreed to an "Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and Agriculture" that was informed by the recommendations of the multilateral organizations. Although the Action Plan has yet to become operationalized, G20 ministers agreed to the following framework at the 2011 Cannes Summit: 1. Improvement of agricultural production and productivity both in the short and long term in order to respond to a growing demand for agricultural commodities; 2. Increasing market information and transparency in order to better anchor expectations from governments and economic operators; 3. Strengthening international policy coordination in order to enhance confidence in international markets and to prevent and respond to food market crises more efficiently; 4. Improving and developing risk management tools for governments, firms and farmers in order to build capacity to manage and mitigate the risks associated with food price volatility, in particular in the poorest countries; 5. Improving the functioning of agricultural commodities' derivatives markets. To date, the most concrete decision arising from the Action Plan has been G20 support for an emergency food reserve pilot program to be headed by the WFP in partnership with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 42 The G20's work on food security has now diffused into its various ministerial groupings, not only at the level of agriculture ministers but also for development and finance ministers. Put in perspective, the G8/G20 have come to play a major role in setting the global policy agenda for food security through its ministerial communiqués and through their capacity to leverage significant financial resources into new commitments.
Managing Interactions among the CFS, CFA and G8/G20
The G8/G20, CFA and CFS all make claim to exercising central authority in global food security governance. G8/G20 leaders claim leadership in a new 'Global Partnership on Agriculture and Food'. The HLTF claims authority to steer the work of UN agencies and other international institutions. The CFS claims responsibility for coordinating a global approach to food security among a diversity of stakeholders. If each of these three institutions hold central positions in global food security governance, then what is the relationship among them? It is clear that there is no official overarching framework that defines the relationship between the HLTF/CFA, G8/G20 and CFS. They cannot be said to be arranged in a nested manner and there is no formal mechanism that coordinates between them. Yet these institutions interact on an increasingly regular, albeit ad hoc basis. This suggests that there is some sort of relationship, even if it not entirely formalized.
One typical approach to analyzing multilateral affairs is to identify hierarchical relationships. Scholars of international institutions often seek to understand hierarchy through principal-agent relationships, where states (principals) delegate authority to international institutions (agents). 43 Yet principal-agent theory does not map well in this case. States are clearly the primary actors in the G8/G20. However, the G8/G20 is an exclusive forum where states interact directly and not through agents. Admittedly, the G8/G20 delegate specific tasks to international institutions such as the World Bank. However, this delegation is not equivalent to the contract at the core of the principal-agent relationship. On the other end of the spectrum, the HLTF/CFA excludes states all together.
Scholars have argued that international institutions enjoy independence and autonomy from their principals and that this provides them with the capacity to be credible actors in global governance. 44 We see that members of the HLTF have acted on their independent authority, not on direct orders from states, because the formulation of the CFA was initiated by the multilateral institutions without any direct prompting by states. The case of the CFS also challenges traditional notions of hierarchy because non-state actors enjoy rights and privileges that were previously only available to states. This has the equivalent effect of diluting states' claims to exclusive authority in that particular context with multilateral institutions and civil society now having significant influence over the CFS' agenda and its policy work.
Dense exchanges occur between the HLTF, CFS and G8/G20. Much of this is the result of overlapping memberships and repeated patterns of interaction between them. At the state level, we observe that member states of the G8 are also voting member states of the CFS and the CFS Bureau. The G8/G20 has also often endorsed the CFA and CFS, which has the effect of increasing the political legitimacy of these latter institutions. At the multilateral institutional level, many of the key members of the HLTF, the FAO, IFAD, WFP, WTO, World Bank and IMF, are also participants at the CFS, including the HLTF coordinator. More recently, the HLTF coordinator and many of the international institutions have been requested to provide policy advice and recommendations to G20 leaders and ministers, thus feeding into that exclusively inter-state forum. This suggests a dynamic, web-like set of cooperative and functional linkages across and through the HLTF, CFS and G8/G20 and their constituent states and institutional members. These dense exchanges could well support a decentralized, networked view of global governance.
Another approach to understanding this relationship and to deciphering the relationship among multiple actors in global governance is to identify whether interactions are leading to policy coherence or incoherence. 45 In a situation where multiple, specialized international institutions are working on food security issues, policy coherence is more likely to occur when actors pursue policies in a coordinated, integrated manner. 46 A reading of all the key policy documents of the HLTF, CFS and G8/G20 suggests a high level of policy coherence and convergence. Indeed, the three institutions repeatedly cross reference each other's objectives and principles in an explicit attempt to work in a coherent manner. More specifically, all three institutions agree on increasing investment in agriculture, increasing smallholder food production, enhancing social protection, and greater coordination between national, regional and international levels. The HLTF, CFS and G8/G20 share policy objectives, exchange information regularly (for example at meetings of the CEB, CFS and G20 working groups), and pool resources by engaging in joint research projects and producing co-authored policy documents. Therefore, from a policy studies perspective at least, overlapping memberships ensure a steady flow of information across all three institutions and shared policy objectives ensures coordination and convergence of technical work and policy interventions. Because of these dense patterns of exchange, there can be said to be de facto coordination across the work of the G8/G20, HLTF/CFA and CFS that enables a high degree of policy coherence.
However, a closer look at each of these institutions reveals occurrences of divergent aims, disagreements and nascent political conflicts. For example the G8/G20 have preferred to steer shy of developing regulatory guidelines for international biofuel policy, despite recommendations from the HLTF for such a policy and direct pressure from global civil society and many developing countries. The CFS, on the other hand, has proposed more stringent rules on foreign investment in agricultural land to prevent illegal land grabs and on agricultural derivatives markets to limit food price volatility. In this way, the CFS supports more robust policy measures that have called for greater transparency from financial actors than the G8/G20. Diverging perspectives on the appropriate policy responses suggest that there is still considerable contestation in global food security governance. However, because there is no centralizing mechanism it is unclear how such contestation is to be resolved. A political realist perspective would suggest that state interests trump in the end. 47 Thus, it would follow that the G8/G20 will have the final say in global deliberations. The authority of the G8/G20 is rooted in the sovereign authority of nation-states. However, the G8/G20 claims of legitimacy are more complex. Even though G8/G20 member states exercise disproportionate power in global political and economic affairs, they cannot claim universality or to speak for the world. On the other end of the spectrum, the key roles played by HLTF and reformed CFS show that non-state actors are exerting significant influence in global food security governance, including the ability to shape global policy agendas and influence states' decision making. The HLTF's authority and legitimacy is twofold, partially rooted in the political and moral authority of the UN Secretary General to act in the interests of the global community and in the moral authority of the WFP and OHCHR, and partially in the technical and expert authority of the FAO and World Bank. 48 The CFS is unique in that its authority and legitimacy are a combination of its transnationalism and its multi-stakeholder representation; it enjoys the political authority of states and technical and moral authority of international institutions and global civil society participants. This latter development is consistent with findings from global governance scholarship showing a greater role for non-state actors, including international institutions, NGOs, philanthropic organizations and the private sector, in contemporary global governance. 49 
Conclusion
The 2008 global food crisis was the catalyst for the development of new institutions in global food security governance. The institutions, the CFS, HLTF/CFA and G8/G20, vary significantly in their memberships, mandates and sources of authority and legitimacy. Each of these institutions claims a central position in global food security governance. Despite sharing policy objectives and engaging in formal, informal and ad hoc coordination, there is still considerable contestation among these three institutions over the future direction of global food security governance. These contests cannot be resolved through state consensus alone and the CFA and CFS provide significant scope for non-state actors to exert influence and claim legitimate roles in global food security governance. In short, global food security governance appears to be shifting towards greater pluralism. The inclusion of transnational peasant groups as participants at the CFS, for example, has given voice to actors historically excluded from participating in global governance. Such changes can potentially enhance the legitimacy of global food security governance by providing food insecure and vulnerable populations direct participation in the decisions that affect their lives. At the same time, greater pluralism in global governance can also amplify tensions and conflicts if there are divergent views. Such effects are most likely to become evident at the CFS in the coming years once its new architecture and deliberation processes become routinized.
Current efforts are underway to enhance cooperation among the CFA/HLTF, CFS and G8/G20 and their highly diverse constituent members. At the time of writing, the CFS has launched consultations for a 'Global Strategic Framework' to further clarify the role of the reformed CFS and its relationship to the CFA and the G20 proposal for a Global Partnership on Food and Agriculture. It was expected that the G20 leaders meeting at Cannes would better clarify the relationship between the G20, the HLTF and CFS. However, this did not occur. This was partially the result of diverging views among G20 states over how this relationship should be best managed. In addition, the strong leadership by international institutions and disagreements among them over the most appropriate interinstitutional architecture played a part as well. As a result, the global food security governance remains in a state of flux and reminds us of the fact that governance is a dynamic and iterative process.
Although there is a broad consensus for an increase in dialogue and coordination, it is difficult to predict what the long term relationship between the G8/G20, CFA/HLTF and CFS may look like. In any event, it is unlikely that states will make such a critical decision on their own. They will look to international institutions and non-state actors for expertise, leadership, and willing partnership. Improving the global governance of food security requires consensus among all actors involved to be truly effective. Broad based consensus, cooperation and participation among states and non-state actors, is an increasingly accepted global approach to address the challenge of food security.
Notes

